Transformation in infrastructure policy from apartheid to democracy by Bond, Patrick et al.
 
 
TRANSFORMATION IN  
INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY 
FROM APARTHEID TO DEMOCRACY: 
 





 Policy associated with basic infrastructure investment -- water 
and sanitation systems, new electricity lines, roads, stormwater 
drainage, and other services provided at municipal level -- has 
been one of  the most troubling aspects of the first five years 
of African National Congress rule. Enormous challenges were 
offered by the infrastructural backlog and ecological 
inheritance. Notwithstanding rhetoric (and Constitutional 
provisions) to the contrary, government quickly retreated 
from its original electoral mandate. Following a section that 
provides brief historical context, this paper offers a reminder 
of infrastructure policy directives in the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme, continuities in ideology represented in 
the government's main housing/infrastructure policy 
documents (especially those finalised during 1996-98), and 
frictions associated with the delivery process, particularly in 
the growing reliance upon municipal services privatisation. 
The paper identifies key moments in the policy-making 
process, and argues that it is only with a different ideological 
approach (drawing upon sound technical analysis) on the part 
of key politicians and officials -- as well as a more liberatory 
perspective and political will in South Africa's civil society 
movements -- that transformation of policy and hence 
delivery will one day be possible. 
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INTRODUCTION : INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY NEEDS FIXING 
 
There are far more continuities than change, between the ungenerous housing 
and household infrastructure policies of the late-apartheid regime and those of 
the ANC government. The most telling principles now widely followed across 
government are that the user must pay the marginal cost of services, that 
standards be minimal for those who cannot afford marginal cost, and that 
commercialisation and indeed privatisation of infrastructure-related services be 
pursued. The contrast between these central infrastructure principles and what 
ANC constituents have traditionally demanded (and what was promised in the 
1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme) is the core subject of this paper. 
 The disjuncture between what is required and what is on offer is not 
an accident, though neither is a necessary outcome. It reflects quite similar 
influences in the form of policy advice that flowed, during the 1980s-90s, from 
the World Bank and its main South African surrogates (the Urban Foundation 
and the Development Bank of Southern Africa). The key apartheid-era 
statements that introduced the site-and-service approach to housing and 
narrow cost-recovery municipal services practices included the Independent 
Development Trust housing grant (1991), the de Loor Report (1992), and the 
National Housing Forum accord (1994). 
 The main post-apartheid infrastructure policies through which we can 
trace the influence of neo-liberal advice are the Housing White Paper of 
November 1994 (Department of Housing), the Water Supply and Sanitation White 
Paper of November 1994, the Urban Infrastructure Investment Framework of March 
1995 (RDP Ministry), the Urban and Rural Development Strategies of October 1995 
(RDP Ministry), the Urban and Rural Development Frameworks of May 1997 
(Departments of Housing and Land Affairs), the Municipal Infrastructure 
Investment Framework of July 1997 (Department of Constitutional Development), 
the Local Government White Paper of February 1998 (Department of 
Constitutional Development), the April 1998 Policy Paper on Intergovernmental 
Finance (Department of Finance), and the August 1998 Draft Regulatory 
Framework for Municipal Service Partnerships. Other papers from the Departments 
of Water Affairs and Forestry, and Energy and Minerals, are similar in tone and 
content. A variety of laws and regulations have codified these policies, even if 
implementation has been uneven. (Notably, many of these can be read as 
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entailing a profound conflict with the South African Constitution, which, 
amongst other socio-economic rights, confers "the right to have access to... 
sufficient... water")(RSA, 1996, s.27.1). 
 Taken together, these core policy statements of infrastructure and 
municipal services policy represent the main barriers to provision of basic 
water, sanitation, electricity and other household and community infrastructure 
investments, and to the cross-subsidisation necessary to pay for the recurrent 
costs associated with minimally decent standards of consumption. This paper 
shows the ebb and flow of the policy argument, invoking aspects of the 
reasoning promoted by the two main opposing camps in the debate:  the neo-
liberals and the progressives. To borrow Tomlinson's (1993) typology of the 
main competing "urban visions," a third group which had earlier dominated 
policy-making -- apartheid-era statists -- had waned decisively by the early 
1990s. 
 Since the neo-liberal camp consistently won the debates and wrote 
policy accordingly (not necessarily because their arguments were more 
convincing, but rather reflecting the balance of forces in society as a whole), it 
is important to show that an alternative, progressive policy framework -- 
providing infrastructure for all, on the basis of "intermediate" level standards 
and a free "lifeline" bloc of water and electricity consumption -- was (and is) 
feasible and affordable. Thus one of the objectives of this paper is to argue that 
South African government policy-makers -- and if not politicians and officials, 
surely the leading civil society organisers -- should return to their roots, drawing 
on insights gained through decades of social struggles by mass democratic 
organisations in townships and villages. What this would mean in practice 
would be providing higher-standard but lower-priced infrastructure and 
services to South Africans than is presently being practiced and contemplated. 
The paper suggests ways to do that rely on domestic (South African) financing, 
not that of the World Bank or other international lenders, through partnerships 
between the first democratic state (at central, provincial and municipal levels) 
and local communities. 
 The paper therefore has a dual function of offering constructive 
criticisms about existing policies and, in its conclusion, posing an alternative. 
Along the way, we dissect crucial aspects of late-apartheid policy and socio-
ecological conditions associated with infrastructure, before considering the 
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ANC government's mandate to deliver infrastructure and services to all South 
Africans, revisiting the debate over municipal services provision, and explaining 





When in 1994 the first democratic government was elected on a platform 
known as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), there was a high 
expectation that politicians and officials would immediately deliver improved 
basic services to the mass constituency of the victorious African National 
Congress (see Bond, 1999a and 1999b, Chapter Four for details). Late-
apartheid household infrastructure practices were sufficiently egregious that 
numerous 1980s social struggles arose, achieved defensive successes (such as 
preventing repossessions of houses and cut-offs of services), and codified a 
more humane approach grounded in a rights-based discourse. No new, 
overarching policy could be generated given the late-apartheid regime's lack of 
credibility, and hence the infrastructure "policy" inherited by the democratic 
government in 1994 was in fact merely an amalgamation of a variety of project-
based, highly fragmented approaches to housing and local government. 
 The context for the policy vacuum is important. After the 1980s rent 
boycotts became debilitating for Black Local Authorities, causing virtually all to 
fall into formal bankruptcy, the apartheid government's national housing funds 
were redirected to covering municipal operating expenses. Attempts to evict 
non-payers and to cut off vital municipal services were successfully resisted by 
residents' mass action, and only a very few Conservative Party-ruled white 
municipalities were able to, even temporarily, punish black residents for non-
payment (a few incidents of cholera generated by services cuts during the early 
1990s were so widely condemned that the practice of disconnection halted). 
Meanwhile, virtually no new houses for "African" people were built by the state 
during the late 1980s. Instead, deregulation of racial restrictions on property 
ownership and the failure of banks' white client base to grow adequately led to 
a dramatic increase in private housing construction in the townships (once the 
mid-1980s civic association protests had been snuffed by state repression) 
(Mayekiso, 1996), fuelled by bank credit on (initially easy) terms. 
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 What this left by the end of the 1980s was a series of recent township 
housing projects -- usually poorly-located, however, on cheaper land in distant 
locations -- with relatively good levels of service (full electricity and fully-
reticulated water and sewerage) for approximately 200 000 households (still 
leaving an estimated three million households without adequate shelter); a slow 
household electrification programme run by Eskom in the main existing urban 
townships (though unevenly, and delays in implementation caused by local 
authority turf problems); and, in the interstices, a dramatic increase in shack 
settlements without even rudimentary services. The first main component of 
the de facto late-apartheid housing policy -- privately-owned, bank-bonded 
housing -- slowed to a virtual standstill from 1990-95 once interest rates on 
housing bonds had increased from their low of 12,5% in 1986 to 20,75% by 
1989, leading to approximately 40% of all borrowers defaulting or falling into 
deep arrears (the interest rate increase also generated the country's longest-ever 
depression, which cost many hundreds of thousands of jobs, including many 
held by township residents with bonds). The second component, electrification, 
picked up slowly and then peaked at close to 400 000 new connections per year 
(including rural areas) in the mid-1990s, as Eskom reacted to political pressure 
by increasing its (high-priced but low-profit) retail supply. The third 
component, upgrading of shack settlements and the formalisation of site-and-
service programmes and projects, became the basis for 1990s infrastructure 
policy. 
 The first key statement of the late-apartheid government's intent to 
establish household infrastructure at inadequate levels for slightly-better 
formalised shack settlements was the 1991 Independent Development Trust 
(IDT) housing grant. Inspired by World Bank "site-and-service" projects and 
policies, the R7 500 IDT capital subsidy for servicing sites was designed and 
largely implemented by officials associated with the Urban Foundation, the 
large corporate-funded think-tank and developer founded by Harry 
Oppenheimer and Anton Rupert in the wake of the 1976 Soweto uprising. The 
IDT projects were quickly labeled "I Do Toilets," because they financed the 
construction of merely a toilet (with no building materials or electricity hook-up 
provided). This "beacon of hope" -- as IDT director (and former Urban 
Foundation director) Jan Steyn put it -- was soon followed by more 
government "toilets in the veld" projects, such as those in very poorly-located 
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settings supported by the Department of Development Aid (whose mandate 
was to fund "self-governing" homelands). 
 Recognising that this new approach could help dampen the fiscal 
requirements associated with rapid urbanisation, in 1992 Department of 
Housing politicians and bureaucrats drafted the Report of the Task Group on 
National Housing Policy and Strategy, which endorsed a World Bank critique of the 
IDT subsidy for being "unrealistically high" (see Bond, 1992, for a critique). In 
terms of guiding principles, as de Loor put it, "Deregulation, commercialisation 
and the employment of sound policies which strengthen market forces and 
provide access to opportunities are all strategies which need strong promotion 
and high priority." As Tomlinson (1993) shows, an entirely different approach 
was adopted by civic associations and their technical colleagues in the "urban 
service organisations" (largely research NGOs in each of the main cities).  
 A degree of criticism of the late-apartheid government's approach 
emerged in the National Housing Forum. But the Forum's domination by 
Urban Foundation personnel and big business lobbyists (and ineffective ANC 
and civic movement participation) assured that the critique would only scratch 
the surface and that in early 1994, in a controversial deal with Louis Shill 
following months of severe conflict (Bond, 1993), a modified site-and-service 
policy (with a R12 500 maximum subsidy) would lay the basis for post-1994 
policy. The key actor in the adoption of the Forum compromise as the basis for 
post-apartheid housing policy was the ANC representative to the Forum, and 
subsequently Department of Housing Director-General, Billy Cobbett. 
According to Swilling (1999), 
 
 It was largely up to Cobbett as to who from the 
democratic movement participated in the policy 
process. When questioned as to why he largely kept the 
urban service organisations out of the national housing 
policy formulation process, he said that there was an 
emphasis from his political bosses on direct 
representation of political and civic leaders rather than 
involvement of "experts" from the urban service 
organisations. This contrasted markedly from the 
strategy of organised business -- in particular the 
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banking institutions -- who seconded large numbers of 
experts into the process and in so doing directly 
influenced the policy agenda in a way that would be 
impossible today, or even during the apartheid era. The 
democratic movement's overcommitted political and 
civic leaders were not equipped to deal with this army 
of technical expertise that were trusted with broad 
negotiating mandates by their principals. The 
consequences of this strategic (mis)calculation will be 
felt for many years. 
 
At the same time, a new definition of service delivery was proposed in the White 
Paper on Water and Sanitation, namely that the "lifeline" price of water to retail 
consumers should be at least equal to the operating and maintenance expenses; 
all previous use of the term lifeline was "free." This was a fundamental 
statement that a neo-liberal pricing policy would prevail in the crucial water 
sector. 
 The socio-ecological inheritance associated with maldistribution of 
infrastructure resources must also be considered. Water management offers 
South African government and society possibly the most serious contemporary 
challenges. Amongst the main problems for environmental management are 
water scarcity; the maldistribution of water; pollution of water sources; other 
forms of structural damage to water ecosystems; and substandard or 
nonexistent sanitation. South Africans have access each year to, on average, 
only 1 200 kl per person of available water, of which half is already dammed. 
Ineffective and destructive uses of water are prevalent. Water scarcity is 
exacerbated by South Africa's erratic rainfall patterns, and the effect of periodic 
droughts on low-income people is particularly devastating (whereas wealthy 
white farmers have traditionally gained access to state compensation during 
droughts). There exists a worrying potential for both domestic and regional 
geopolitical conflict over access to water, with South Africa already draining 
Lesotho's water and with controversial plans underway to tap other regional 
sources, as well as border rivers (such as the Orange River bordering Namibia, 
via the Lesotho Highlands Water Project). 
 The distribution of South Africa's water across the population is even 
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more unequal, measured in class, race and gender terms, than the distribution 
of income. More than half of the country's raw water is used for white-
dominated commercial agriculture, of which half is considered to be wasted due 
to poor irrigation techniques and inappropriate crop choice. Another quarter is 
used in mining and industry. Around 12% of South Africa's water is consumed 
by households, but of that amount, more than half goes into (white people's) 
gardens and swimming pools, and less than a tenth is consumed by all black 
South African households. Minimal water access is one reason for black South 
Africans suffering by far the highest infant mortality and water-related disease 
rates in all of Africa in relation to per capita GDP. Access by the majority is 
improving only marginally, notwithstanding massive cross-watershed pumping 
of water, for example, from Lesotho, done inexplicably (as shown below) in the 
name of development. In rural areas, the Departments of Agriculture and of 
Water Affairs and Forestry are making only minimal efforts to improve water 
access to black farmers, and indeed due to impending water shortages the 
government will only expand existing water supply systems (which irrigate 
white farmland) -- the Lesotho Highlands, the Tugela, Mkzomazi and 
Mzimvubu basins, the Orange River and Western Cape sources -- with only a 
tiny fraction of resources spent on new irrigation schemes for emergent 
farmers. 
 Likewise, water-borne sanitation is available to only around one third 
of black South Africans, and excessive amounts of water (typically 13 litres per 
flush) are used in virtually all middle- and upper-class areas. Although a solid-
waste sanitation system is desirable, so too would universal installation of low-
flush and dual-flush toilets (as well as low-flow showerheads) save water and 
cut sewage treatment costs, while sanitation services could be extended to all 
households (although this would contradict current policy on household 
affordability grounds, regardless of the social and ecological consequences). 
Dumping of untreated sewage into the sea remains an issue. Mass pit latrines in 
urban and peri-urban areas remain factors in the spread of faecal bacteria. 
 More general pollution of water ultimately destined for human 
consumption arises from largely unregulated discharges from industry, from 
waste dump runoff, and from agricultural chemicals and mine tailings/slimes 
dams. Faecal pollution is a problem in many urban areas due to most low-
income households' inadequate sanitation. Acid rain is considered extremely 
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prevalent in coal-burning regions of the country. All these features of pollution 
increase water treatment costs and raise public health risks to many low-income 
households dependent upon direct access to unpurified water. Water 
ecosystems suffer enormous soil loss and siltation through commercial 
agriculture, erosion caused by overcrowded rural areas, polluted aquifers from 
mining waste, the exhaustion of aquifers from excessive irrigation, and drainage 
of wetlands and regions with high levels of forestry (especially invasive-alien 
eucalyptus and pine plantations). There are also problems in declining natural 
flow-rates of rivers due to cross-watershed pumping (resulting, too, in 
increased urbanisation pressure), siltation of dam storage capacity (costing up to 
$30 million per year), and salination and waterlogging of land due to intensive 
irrigation. 
 Similar features of South Africa's energy inheritance deserve comment: 
 a reliance on (and oversupply of) coal-generated electricity; lack of equitable 
access amongst households along class/race lines (with particularly severe 
gender implications); and related inefficiency in use associated with apartheid 
geographical segregation and urban sprawl. The strength of the coal mining 
industry fostered a reliance on electricity, with per capita consumption as high 
as in England (notwithstanding the fact that until recently only a quarter of 
South Africans had access to domestic sources) and per capita emissions of 
greenhouse gasses twice as high per capita as the rest of the world. In turn this 
reflects the importance of what has been termed the "Minerals-Energy-
Complex" -- South Africa's economic core, effectively run by a handful of 
mining-based conglomerates and friendly parastatal agencies -- which has 
traditionally accounted for 1/4 to 1/3 of South Africa's GDP (and which even 
in the 1980s and 1990s, as the gold price declined, was the most important and 
dynamic sector). As one example of the power still invested in these large firms, 
the parastatal electricity company justifies ignoring its own anti-pollution 
policies (for example, refusing to install scrubbers at coal-fired stations, earning 
the wrath of even its own accountants) by the need to generate cheap electricity 
for export-led minerals and metals growth. As a result, electricity generation has 
been associated with high levels of greenhouse gasses, very high levels of acid 
rain, enormous surface water pollution, badly regulated nuclear supplies (near 
Cape Town), and ineffectual safety/health standards in coal mines. Poor 
planning two decades ago led to massive supply overcapacity (at peak in the 
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early 1990s, 50% more than demanded), yet very little of the capacity has been 
used to provide low-income people with sufficiently cheap energy. 
 Indeed, the meager electricity consumed by low-income households 
(about 3% of the total) comes at a high price (in 1996, R0,20/kWh) in relation 
to the very low-cost supply of power to large corporate consumers, particularly 
the mines and minerals smelters (in 1996, less than R0,06/kWh). Hence even 
after more than a million households were added to the electricity grid during 
the 1990s, many could not afford to maintain consumption at levels sufficiently 
profitable for the state electricity company, relying instead for lighting, cooking 
and heating on paraffin (with its burn-related health risks), coal (with high levels 
of domestic and township-wide air pollution) and wood (with consequences for 
deforestation). Women are far more adversely affected by the unaffordability of 
electric power sources, as well as in expending time and energy to obtain 
alternative energy sources. Reacting to these formidable infrastructure-related 
problems, government turned to neo-liberal principles, particularly lower 
standards, higher cost-recovery, and creeping privatisation -- notwithstanding a 




Given that many Democratic Movement leaders saw transitional bargaining 
fora like the National Housing Forum as merely stepping stones to power and 
policy-making, it was not obvious initially how much Cobbett's early 1994 
acceptance of site-and-service principles would shape future developments. The 
RDP was meant to change matters radically. As ANC leader Nelson Mandela 
remarked at the victory party on May 2, "We have emerged as the majority 
party on the basis of the programme which is contained in the Reconstruction 
and Development book. That is going to be the cornerstone, the foundation, 
upon which the Government of National Unity is going to be based. I appeal 
to all leaders who are going to serve in this government to honour this 
programme." 
 The RDP's paper on "Meeting Basic Needs" began with an ambitious 
statement (ANC, 1994, section 2.1.3):  "With a per capita gross national 
product (GNP) of more than R8 500 South Africa is classified as an upper 
middle income country. Given its resources, South Africa can afford to feed, 
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house, educate and provide health care for all its citizens." The document 
proceeded to list a number of specific areas (many related to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights) in which South Africans 
can consider themselves entitled to an adequate consumption level of goods and 
services. The RDP's approach, in short, was to ensure that essential service 
needs were met through vast increases in government subsidies when the 
market failed, and by mobilising additional resources through partnerships, 
more forcefully tapping capital markets, and via off-budget methods. This was 
government's overarching mandate in the area of infrastructure and services, 
and concrete suggestions with regard to housing, land reform and services were 
made to direct policy-makers in detail. 
 Thus, for example, the RDP offered hope for a decent residential 
existence far beyond what was on offer in existing site-and-service schemes 
(ANC, 1994, section 2.5.7):  "As a minimum, all housing must provide 
protection from weather, a durable structure, and reasonable living space and 
privacy. A house must include sanitary facilities, storm-water drainage, a 
household energy supply (whether linked to grid electricity supply or derived 
from other sources, such as solar energy), and convenient access to clean 
water." The budgetary goal for housing expenditure in the RDP is 5% of the 
entire national budget; this goal was repeated in the Housing White Paper. The 
failure of the first democratic government's housing policy to ensure such 
standards -- due to its focus on "incremental" building techniques, a maximum 
subsidy only half of that required to build housing (R15 000 instead of R30 
000), and bank-centred financing -- is not the subject of this paper (Bond, 
1999a and 1999b, Chapter Four). But it is noteworthy that the World Bank 
(1994) intervened in the housing policy debate shortly after the 1994 election 
and recommended that proposed subsidy levels be decreased and more use 
made of commercial banks. Within three months, the outlines of the new 
policy, which conflicted dramatically with the RDP, were adopted. 
 Likewise, as specified in the RDP (ANC, 1994, sections 2.4.12, 2.4.14) 
the rural land reform "programme must include the provision of services to 
beneficiaries of land reform so that they can use their land as productively as 
possible" and "must aim to redistribute 30 per cent of agricultural land within 
the first five years of the programme." But as in the case of housing, a World 
Bank land reform team made market-oriented policy suggestions (e.g., a willing-
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seller, willing-buyer "kulak" model based on small grants and unsubsidised 
interest rates) in 1993 which were ultimately adopted by the new government 
(see Williams, 1996, for details and a critique). And as in the case of housing, 
the maximum land reform subsidy is R15 000, and provision of rural 
infrastructure and services were not considered as integral to provision of 
services to land reform recipients. Instead of redistributing 30% of agricultural 
land within five years, it is more likely that the Department of Land Affairs will 
redistribute less than 1%. 
 How, according to the RDP, were infrastructure and services to be 
paid for? The RDP (ANC, 1994, sections 2.6.10, 2.7.8) specifies the need for 
tariff restructuring, cross-subsidies and lifeline services to the poor, with respect 
to both water (including sanitation) and electricity: 
 
 To ensure that every person has an adequate water supply, the 
national tariff structure must include the following: 
  • a lifeline tariff to ensure that all South Africans are 
able to afford water services sufficient for health and 
hygiene requirements; 
  • in urban areas, a progressive block tariff to ensure 
that the long-term costs of supplying large-volume 
users are met and that there is a cross-subsidy to 
promote affordability for the poor, and 
  • in rural areas, a tariff that covers operating and 
maintenance costs of services, and recovery of capital 
costs from users on the basis of a cross-subsidy from 
urban areas in cases of limited rural affordability. 
  
 The electrification programme will cost around R12 billion 
with annual investments peaking at R2 billion. This must be 
financed from within the industry as far as possible via cross-
subsidies from other electricity consumers. Where necessary 
the democratic government will provide concessionary 
finance for the electrification of poor households in remote 
rural areas. A national Electrification Fund, underwritten by a 
government guarantee, must be created to raise bulk finance 
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from lenders and investors for electrification. Such a fund 
could potentially be linked to a Reconstruction Fund to be 
utilised for other related infrastructural financing needs. A 
national domestic tariff structure with low connection fees 
must be established to promote affordability. 
 
With national tariff reform emphasising cross-subsidies (using national and 
provincial resources, not just local) and lifeline tariffs for low-income 
consumers, and with a more appropriate use of housing subsidies to finance 
deeper levels of capital infrastructure -- neither of which should ultimately cost central 
government anything extra beyond even the existing (planned) urban housing and rural land 
reform grants -- promises of humane standards of infrastructure and services for 
all South Africans can be kept, and additional public health, environmental and 
economic benefits to all of society (particularly women and children) can be 
gained. 
  To clarify the difference between this mandate and the approach 
adopted to date, it is worth providing a critical assessment of the existing 
options government is now considering. We dispense with the conflict-ridden 
housing policy debate, for although it is crucial to understanding why so little 
state funding was made available in comparison to what was promised, why 
developers rather than the state and communities drove post-apartheid housing 
projects, and why so many other urban RDP promises were so explicitly 
violated (Bond, 1999a and 1999b), it is more important to communicate the 
details of declining infrastructure standards, below even that of "toilets-in-the-
veld." 
 
THE POST-APARTHEID MUNICIPAL SERVICES DEBATE 
 
The Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework (MIIF) describes the main 
infrastructure and services options planned by government. This framework, 
according to the Department of Constitutional Development's (DCD's) (1997, 
2) "User-Friendly Guide," used "an economic modelling exercise to estimate 
services backlogs; assess the capital costs that are involved in removing these 
backlogs; and calculate the recurrent costs of operating and maintaining the 
services." 
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 In late 1994 and early 1995, based on Urban Infrastructure Investment 
Framework (UIIF) recommendations by a consultancy team dominated by 
World Bank staff, key officials in the Ministry for Reconstruction and 
Development agreed that government would provide only minimal 
infrastructure and services to low-income urban South Africans. The same 
ministry's draft Urban Development Strategy (UDS) -- released in October 1995 -- 
reflected government thinking on service provision from late 1994 through late 
1996. The UDS summary demonstrates the inadequacy of standards then 
contemplated for urban "municipal" areas (rural infrastructure plans had not 
been developed at that stage) (RSA, 1995, 24-25): 
 
 An average national distribution of 55:25:20 between full, 
intermediate and basic levels of services in municipal areas is 
considered a realistic target for the infrastructure investment strategy 
over the next ten years... "Basic services" means communal 
standpipes (water), on site sanitation, graded roads with gravel and 
open stormwater drains and streetlights (electricity). These services 
will be targeted at households with an income of less than R800 per 
month and charged for at between R35 and R50 per month. 
"Intermediate services" entail water provision through yard taps on 
site, simple water-borne sanitation, narrow paved roads with no 
curbs and open drains and 30 amps electricity with prepaid meters 
for households. These should be affordable to households which 
earn between R800 and R1700 per month and will cost them 
between R100 and R130 per month. "Full services mean house 
connected water supplies, full water-borne sanitation, paved roads 
with curbs and piped drains and 60 amps electricity provision. It is 
anticipated that households in the R1700-R3500 monthly income 
class could afford "low consumption" costing them between R180 
and R220 per month. Households with monthly incomes of above 
R3500 will be assumed able to pay for "full services at high 
consumption" at charges between R270 and R350 per month. 
 
Partly because MIIF was already controversial (see, e.g., Mail and Guardian, 
22/11/96 and Bond, 1997), extensive technical persuasion and a degree of 
policy advocacy (mainly through the National Economic Development and 
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Labour Council) had the effect of raising the infrastructure standards slightly 
higher than was initially proposed in the UIIF, draft UDS and early drafts of 
the MIIF. Instead of no electricity, there was the potential for urban 
households to receive an 8 Amp supply; and instead of paying R35-50 per 
month for these services, a subsidy of approximately R50 per low-income 
household was planned (whether this was enough to cover basic operating 
costs was questionable, and indeed whether the grant was sustainable given 
budget constraints remained to be seen, but as shown below, there were 
substantial doubts about this method of subsidy). 
 In short, there were several minor improvements over "basic" 
standards of services. But there remained -- as "probably affordable to all in 
urban settlements" (DCD, 1997, 18) -- many objectionable components of the 
basic MIIF package:  pit latrines, communal (not house or yard) standpipes, a 
weak electricity supply, gravel roads, open storm-water drains, communal waste 
dumps (not kerbside removal), and other reflections of an extremely stingy 
infrastructure package. Under the "low" growth scenario (most realistic in view 
of the failure of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy to meet any 
but the inflation and budget deficit targets), nearly 30% of urban residents 
would be subject to these low standards even after the ten-year plan (1997-
2006) for service provision was fully implemented. 
 Though we do not have the space in this paper to fully explore the 
rural implications of MIIF, the standards under the low scenario were even 
lower, with 70% of the rural population anticipated to have the "basic" services 
discussed above after a decade, and 20% to have no services at all (DCD, 1997, 
19). In both urban and rural settings, as noted below, the implementation 
progress was far slower than even the low target levels specified in MIIF. 
 Several other criticisms of MIIF must also be recorded. The service 
levels contemplated in MIIF were not merely emergency services (piped water 
or portable toilets in slum settlements that are without water or hygienic 
facilities at present), but represented, more fundamentally, permanent 
development policy. A crucial problem in the affordability calculations was the 
overoptimistic projection in MIIF that (in inflation-adjusted terms) only around 
20% of urban households would still earn less than R800 per month within ten 
years. In addition, on technical grounds, there are six other important points to 
be made regarding the low levels in government's infrastructure and service 
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provision policy. 
 First, a national tariff structure was not developed consistent with the 
cross-subsidisation and lifeline tariff provisions mandated in the RDP. Second, 
public health benefits associated with increased access to services were not 
adequately factored in. Third, environmental problems associated with the 
proposed standards were not adequately addressed or factored in. Fourth, 
implications of the infrastructure policy for microeconomic linkages and for 
macroeconomic policy were not adequately addressed or factored in as a means 
of overcoming affordability constraints. Fifth, the implications of infrastructure 
standards for women were not adequately considered and factored in. Sixth, the 
spatial implications of class segregation implicit in the programme -- with all the 
consequent economic inefficiencies -- lent themselves to creation of new, post-
apartheid racial ghettos where it will be physically impossible or excessively 
costly to upgrade from "basic" to full services. While recognising this problem, 
MIIF did nothing to counteract it; again the costs associated with neo-apartheid 
geography were neither calculated nor factored in (see Bond, 1999a for details 
of these problems). 
 The main investment implications are important to note at the outset, 
namely that the "net economic return" on infrastructure investments should 
incorporate not only the immediate financial return -- the amount of cost 
recovery as a ratio of the amount invested -- but also other social benefits, 
costs, externalities and multipliers. Having failed to do so in the areas noted 
above, the MIIF provided for low standards of infrastructure on grounds that 
these standards were the most that low-income South Africans can afford to 
pay. 
 To illustrate the broader approach, even the World Bank's Washington 
DC headquarters has provided guidelines (and an example from Nepal) for 
interpreting the economic return and for using this as the basis for justifying 
projects, in a manner not accomplished nor even attempted by the World Bank 
staff who advised the South African government: 
 
 [In Kathmandu] based on estimates using narrowly defined project 
appraisal techniques, [net] benefits from the city's new $150 million 
water distribution system... [equalled] $5.2 million. Using the more 
detailed service-level approach to project appraisal, however, it was 
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determined that in some cases health benefits from a reduction in 
coliform contamination of the water approached $1,000 per unit 
serviced. An education program that improved water use led to 
further reductions in health and transport costs. After these indirect 
benefits were factored in, the project showed a positive net benefit 
of about $275 million (World Bank, 1994, 82). 
 
Specifically, in light of the failure to consider the broader economic returns to 
infrastructure investment, the main reason that "basic" levels of service were 
being imposed upon the vast majority of the poor is the allegedly high recurrent 
costs of water and electricity. In the absence of subsidies, these costs prohibit 
low-income households from paying full cost-recovery rates for even a minimal 
monthly amount of these services. A subsidy should cover sufficient services -- 
according to the RDP, for example, "an on-site supply of 50-60 litres per capita 
per day of clean water" (section 2.6.7), and sufficient electricity to cover the 
energy requirements associated with essential lighting, heating and cooking for a 
typical family (approximately 100 kilowatt hours per average family per month) 
-- such that all South Africans attain a minimally-decent standard of living 
regardless of their ability to pay. Instead, an approach emphasising cost 
recovery and "limited" local-level cross-subsidies was adopted. According to 
the UDS, 
  
 Services and infrastructure will be introduced in line with the 
affordability levels of communities affected. The principle that 
people should pay for the services to which they have access 
is central. This means that the level of services in each area 
should relate to what the consumers there can afford and are 
willing to pay for. Where government support is needed to 
ensure basic service delivery, it will be provided transparently. 
Deliberate steps will be taken to remove any disguised 
subsidies. Limited cross-subsidies to enhance household 
affordability and secure "lifeline" consumption will be 
necessary (RSA, 1995, 22). 
 
Two points should be made immediately. First, the UDS failed to mention that 
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urban services in existing middle- and high-income areas were heavily 
subsidised for decades, from surpluses generated through business levies 
(ultimately based on transfers from black workers and consumers whose 
employers and retail outlets were historically, by law, located in white areas). 
 Second, South Africa's majority is so poor -- especially in relation to 
the minority of luxury consumers who have never had to worry about access to 
full services -- that "limited cross-subsidies" are insufficient and the exercise of 
recovering costs on collectively consumed services (a communal tap, for 
example) is often futile or too administratively expensive. Indeed, the reason 
that the phrase "limited" is used in this context is because of government's 
explicit refusal to consider (even as an policy option exercise) restructuring 
national tariffs so that substantial cross-subsidies could be obtained. If such a 
proposal -- consistent with the RDP -- had been considered and adopted, it 
would have been relatively easy to cross-subsidise from national-scale industrial, 
service-sector, mining and agricultural bulk users of water and electricity, to 
low-income residential consumers. The vast difference in use patterns allows a 
small marginal increase in tariffs for the large users and a lifeline service at no 
cost to all other consumers as an entitlement. Such a progressive block tariff 
system would also penalise excessive usage, thereby contributing to 
conservation goals. 
 At this stage of the argument, prior to describing some of the related 
household water policies of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 
early evidence of infrastructure delivery and the implications of the current 
policy, an alternative approach should be clarified. Most importantly, how large 
a subsidy can South Africa afford to provide users of basic-needs infrastructural 
services? Ironically, the UDS states, "the government's aim is to increase 
housing's share of the budget to 5 per cent and housing delivery to a sustained 
350 000 units per annum within five years" (RSA, 1995, 28), which repeats not 
only the RDP commitment (section 2.5.5) but the same goal stated in 
government's Housing White Paper. With that level of fiscal support -- R10 billion 
in public investment per annum (in present value rands, given a 1998/9 
national budget of R200 billion) -- devoted to the capital costs of housing, and 
with the sorts of cross-subsidies and lifeline service provision anticipated in the 
RDP to offset households' ongoing expenses, there is no question that the 
supply of services at much higher levels is financially feasible for all South 
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Africans.  
 In sum, options consistent with the RDP are required (and are 
feasible) to provide higher standards that better reflect the variety of costs and 
benefits associated with infrastructure and services. To do so would require not 
only spending roughly 10% more than is planned on capital investment in 
infrastructure, but also locating financing sources for recurrent costs within 
existing service suppliers through national-scale cross-subsidies such that a 
lifeline entitlement is provided to all South Africans and greater resource 
conservation is achieved. But the difficulties of winning support even from a 
minister (Kader Asmal) who in principle agreed with these sentiments is 
described next. 
 
DELIVERY CRISIS:  THE CASE OF WATER 
 
The delivery crisis is virtually universal when it comes to meeting basic needs, 
and so it is useful to focus in detail upon the infrastructure-related service that 
has been considered perhaps the most successful example of the new 
government's commitment and capacity:  water. By 1998, according to the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF), 18 million South Africans 
were without basic water supply and 27 million had no basic sanitation (SA 
Institute of Race Relations, 1998, 327). And yet by year-end 1998, Minister of 
Water Affairs and Forestry Asmal was hailed for having served three million 
people, mainly in rural areas, with new water connections. (Figures are 
unreliable, and in a best-case account, according to a PanAfrican News Agency 
report on 6/2/99, Nelson Mandela told parliament that "in 1994, when the 
ANC was elected, some 30 per cent of South Africans lacked access to safe 
supply of water near their homes. Today, after three million people have 
benefitted from the government's water supply programme, the percentage has 
been reduced to 20.") 
 Rarely mentioned is the notorious unsustainability of the water 
projects, which were said by DWAF insiders to have rendered as many as 90% 
of the new taps inoperative. Rarely mentioned is the extraordinary upsurge in 
water cut-offs, which included, as an example, 70 000 black township residents 
of Leandra, Mpumalanga, who suffered 70% water pressure cut-off for several 
months in late 1998 at the hands of Rand Water, due to a non-payment rate of 
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nearly 70% (Sunday Independent Reconstruct, 20/12/98). But amongst those 
suffering cuts were households which had paid their bills. 
The development of water and sanitation policy reflected and in some 
important respects preceded the overarching urban, rural and municipal 
infrastructure policy processes. A mere six months after the 1994 election, 
Minister Asmal's first white paper announced that "where poor communities 
are not able to afford basic services, government may subsidise the cost of 
construction of basic minimum services but not the operating, maintenance or 
replacement costs" (DWAF, 1994, 19). The insistence on charging the full 
operating and maintenance costs (and thus the refusal to keep to the mandate 
in the RDP that all are entitled to access to sufficient lifeline water for their 
reasonable needs) was based on two assertions. 
 First, the Water and Sanitation White Paper (DWAF, 1994, 23) states that 
if government covers operating and maintenance costs, there will be a 
"reduction in finances available for the development of basic services for those 
citizens who have nothing. It is therefore not equitable for any community to 
expect not to have to pay for the recurring costs of their services. It is not the 
Government who is paying for their free services but the unserved." The White 
Paper thus argues for a "some for all, not all for some" approach. But the false 
dichotomy between "width" and "depth" is presented as fact, without any 
reference to available sources of finance or to the potential of cross-
subsidisation, as recommended in the RDP, in generating the finances available 
to meet everyone's entitlement to water.  
 Second, the White Paper repeats the widely held but unsubstantiated 
assertion that payment for services is the single defining feature that determines 
whether people and communities behave responsibly: "The other reason why 
operating and maintenance costs should be borne by the communities is the 
principle of Community-Based Development. If the community expects some 
outside agency to be responsible for keeping their supplies going, they will have 
no control over the processes and lose leverage and ownership. Responsibility 
for keeping the service going is placed with a remote authority and 
accountability is lost. This will have an impact on the reliability of supplies" 
(DWAF, 1994, 24). 
 The National Sanitation Policy White Paper, released in 1996, reiterated the 
"some for all, not all for some" approach and included as a principle that the 
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user pays:  "Sanitation systems must be sustainable. This means they must be 
affordable to the service provider, and payment by the user is essential to 
ensure this" (DWAF, 1996, 4). Shortly thereafter, however, Asmal (1996a, 1) 
came out strongly against the misleading supply-side definition of lifeline. At 
the launch of the 1996 Annual Report of the Working for Water Programme, 
he said: 
 
 We feel that we should not employ workers who refuse to pay for 
their water -- provided (and this is most important) that the local 
authority has in place a lifeline tariff for the first five kilolitres of 
water per month. And note that by "lifeline" I mean a life-giving 
tariff, and not some engineering solution like the "operating and 
maintenance costs." 
 
In a talk on water conservation in Cape Town the same year, Asmal (1996b, 2) 
put it even more strongly:  "I see that the term `life-line' has been hijacked: it is 
being taken to refer to the operational and maintenance costs, as a reflection of 
engineering elegance rather than social needs." Asmal thus repeatedly 
repudiated the central approach of his White Papers, yet still kept to the short-
term aim of the RDP to provide between 20–30 litres of water per person per 
day, short of the medium-term aim of 50–60 litres.  
 The White Paper on a National Water Policy for South Africa of 1997 
reflected an uneasy compromise between the cost recovery and life-line 
approaches. It concedes the right of all to have access to basic water services 
and includes the following key proposals for incorporation into the Water Law: 
 
 • To promote the efficient use of water, the policy will be to charge 
users for the full financial costs of providing access to water, including 
infrastructure development and catchment management activities. 
 • To promote equitable access to water for basic needs, provision will 
also be made for some or all of these charges to be waived (DWAF, 
1997, 4). 
 
The document also defines a "reserve" for basic human needs: "This will be 
provided free of charge in support of the current policy of Government which 
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is to encourage the adoption of lifeline tariffs for water services to ensure that 
all South Africans can achieve access to basic services." But the 1997 White 
Paper only deals with the first tier level, that of water in catchments under 
central government control, and excludes the second and third tier levels, 
namely water as distributed and delivered by agencies including water boards 
and local governments. In practice, the approach to basic needs thus amounts 
to an acceptance of the position that communities fetching water from natural 
sources do not need to pay for the first 25 litres per person per day. For 
communities that receive water from built water systems, the document does 
not go beyond the principle of access to basic water services and does not 
describe how this entitlement is to be achieved. 
 Despite the more ambiguous current policy position on entitlement 
and, in particular, the lifeline tariff, the Department of Water Affairs is in 
practice instructing its staff and all agencies carrying out community water 
supply and sanitation activities on its behalf to implement the standards and 
tariffs as defined in the 1994 White Paper to the letter. Community water supply 
projects include communal standpipes at 200 metres and, despite the array of 
problems associated with collecting payment for water from communal 
standpipes, the principle of full payment for the operating, maintenance and 
replacement costs is insisted on. Once projects have been built, communities 
don't receive further support. 
 There are extremely serious problems in the community water supply 
projects; indeed within the Department it is acknowledged informally that the 
rate of failure is as high as 90%. Reasons invariably include very real 
affordability constraints and an unwillingness to pay for communal standpipes. 
Communal standpipes are often not seen as a significant improvement on 
existing sources of water. Other important reasons for failure include poor 
quality of construction, areas within communities without service and 
intermittent supply. 
 Community water supply systems have led to numerous instances of 
inequity. Adjacent communities pay different amounts depending on the 
systems installed. Rural households pay for water from standpipes, whereas 
households in Durban getting water on site get the first 6 kilolitres per month 
for free. (According to the Durban Metro, 6 kilolitres is the breakeven point 
between the cost of collecting payment and the amount collected.) 
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Communities with new water systems must pay for the ongoing functioning of 
their systems whereas communities supplied by the former Bantustan 
governments get their water for free. These inequities have led to significant 
levels of community tension within and between villages. And, despite the 
claim to provide "some to all," vast areas have not received water services to 
date. 
 The 1994 White Paper (DWAF, 1994, 19) considered the inequity 
between the new systems and those of the former Bantustans: 
 
 This will require a substantial revision of present policy since 
Government grants or "subsidies" have been given in the water 
sector for many years. These have generally been targeted at specific 
sectors of the population to promote policy objectives such as 
agricultural production in the commercial sector and the stabilisation 
of "separate development" structures. 
 
The removal of the subsidies and replacement of inequity with equity at the 
lowest common denominator -- nonfunctioning water systems where they exist 
at all -- is now being implemented.  
 DWAF's response to the high level of project failure has been to move 
further from the entitlement to water as spelt out in the constitution and from 
the mechanism of financing this entitlement as spelt out in the RDP, partly 
egged on by advisors from international agencies such as the World Bank 
(Masia et al, 1998). The insistence on communal standpipes is unchanged, but 
they are now being built with prepayment meters to ensure payment up front. 
Instead of moving towards the medium-term aim of the RDP and providing 
taps on site, the Department has proved willing to relax the 200 metre criterion 
and allow for standpipes further apart so as to limit the number and thereby 
cost of prepayment metres.  
 DWAF's response to a self-generated crisis of delivery, clearly based to 
an important extent on inadequate financing systems, was paralleled by a 
tendency across government infrastructure delivery agencies -- led by DCD -- 
to consider private sector management assistance, contracting out, concessions 
and outright privatisation of infrastructure. 
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MUNICIPAL SERVICES PARTNERSHIP POLICY 
 
Partly as a corollary to government's retreat from its policy mandate and its 
failure to deliver infrastructure of even low standards, lead bureaucrats within 
DCD and DWAF also began pushing a privatisation agenda beginning in 1995. 
Municipalities were encouraged to contract out infrastructure-related services to 
the private sector using what were initially called Public-Private Partnerships 
(PPPs), for which in 1997 the DCD issued guidelines and helped establish a 
Municipal Infrastructure Investment Unit (MIIU) based at the Development 
Bank of Southern Africa. This was followed by DCD's draft regulatory 
framework in August 1998, in which PPPs were rebaptised as Municipal 
Service Partnerships (MSPs) and characterised as "a variety of risk-sharing 
structures within public-public, public-private and public-NGO/CBO 
partnerships" (DCD, August 1998, v). By December 1998, the SA Local 
Government Association and DCD had negotiated a Municipal Framework 
Agreement with unions. 
 As an aside, beginning in 1996 DWAF's Community Water Supply and 
Sanitation programme commissioned several dozen extremely small-scale, rural 
PPPs, known as Build-Operate-Train-and-Transfer contracts, involving NGOs 
and some private firms. But such serious problems soon emerged -- 
unsustainability, lack of consumer affordability given cost-recovery pricing 
policy, poor technical design, poor community control functions, mismatched 
NGO/private-sector roles and expectations, systematic inconsistencies with 
neighbouring government-subsidised water schemes, and lack of training and 
transfer prospects -- that by 1999, the concept was in many areas evaluated as a 
"failure" with respect to implementation by DWAF and DCD -- whereby 
according to Masia et al (1998, 11), "The gaps between practice and policy have 
to be addressed head on lest the policies be invalidated" -- and by its favoured 
NGO implementing agency, the Mvula Trust (Bakker, 1998). 
 Thus within about four years of the advent of democracy, key political 
decision-makers within the South African state -- at national and local levels -- 
had been won over to what effectively amounted to creeping privatisation of 
core local services:  rubbish removal, water works and even municipal electricity 
supply. The primary advocates of privatisation were the World Bank and its 
private sector investment arm, the International Finance Corporation (which in 
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1997 announced a $25 million investment in Standard Bank's South Africa 
Infrastructure Fund, an explicit privatisation financing vehicle) (African 
Development Bank, 1997), as well as local and international firms. Banque 
Paribas, Rand Merchant Bank, Colechurch International, the Development 
Bank of Southern Africa, Generale des Eaux, Metsi a Sechaba Holdings, Sauer 
International and Lyonnaise Water had all met with officials of Port Elizabeth, 
for example, by 1997, in the wake of a week-long 1996 World Bank study of 
the council's waterworks which suggested just one policy option:  full 
privatisation (Port Elizabeth Municipality, 1998; Bond, 1999a, Chapter 4). 
 But there was also resistance, and not only from usual suspects like the 
SA Municipal Workers Union and the Congress of SA Trade Unions, some of 
the more advanced civic groups and in places like Nelspruit, the SA 
Communist Party and ANC Youth League. So too was privatisation contested 
by some municipal bureaucrats -- interestingly, a large fraction of "Old Guard" 
(pre-1994) officials -- such as one from East London who argued, "PPPs are 
not always the best way to go. Costs creep up especially by the third year. So we 
don't accept that we will save money. By the time the contract expires, 
everything is ruined. We have lots of companies coming to do presentations, 
but we will not be caught. They take over your staff and you loose control over 
them. It is not sustainably cheaper" (interview, December 1998). 
 As the 1998 Local Government White Paper was being drafted, these 
concerns were flagged by Hemson (1997) in an international literature review: 
 
 corruption in the tendering and drawing up of contracts, 
particularly in the US; monopoly in the privatised service; 
higher user charges; inflated director's fees, share options, and 
management salaries; widescale retrenchments; and anti-union 
policies... The effects of privatisation bear most radically on 
the poorest in the community; there is widespread evidence of 
more cut-offs in service and generally a harsher attitude 
towards low-income "customers." Water in Britain is a case in 
point. Water and sewerage bills have increased by an average 
of 67 percent between 1989/90 and 1994/95, and during 
roughly the same period the rate of disconnections due to 
non-payment by 177 percent. The inflexibility and hostility 
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which often characterised public utilities attitude towards non-
payment has, over the same period, been replaced by an 
emphasis on pre-payment meters and "self-disconnection" as 
public goods have been commodified. Pre-payment metering 
is greatly advantageous to companies as the problem of 
poorer customers is avoided, there is a continuous revenue 
stream in advance of consumption, less of a "political" 
problem in confronting disconnections, and better form of 
debt recovery. Self-disconnection is education of 
consumption below the level consistent with health, safety 
and participation in normal community life. Surprisingly high 
number of self-disconnections for various periods of 49 
percent by those using pre-payment devices in a trial period. 
Self-disconnection is associated with the reduction of 
consumption below the level consistent with health, safety 
and participation in normal community life. Studies have 
shown a surprisingly high number of self-disconnections of 
water supply for various periods by as much as 49 percent by 
those using pre-payment devices over a trial period. The most 
critical feature of privatisation, however, has been that cross-
subsidies are rooted out after privatisation:  those who need 
costly help have to pay for these services directly themselves... 
Rather than cross-subsidies there has been the introduction of 
"cost-reflective" pricing (in which prices reflect the particular 
costs associated with a particular customer) will end with 
greater differences in regional charges, the poorer paying 
more, and better off people with cheque accounts paying less 
with direct debits. 
 
The critiques were joined from a surprising source in early 1998, namely World 
Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz (1998, 17-18), who conceded that 
 
 the conditions under which privatisation can achieve the 
public objectives of efficiency and equity are very limited, and 
are very similar to the conditions under which competitive 
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markets attain Pareto-efficient outcomes. If, for instance, 
competition is lacking then creating a private, unregulated 
monopoly will likely result in even higher prices for 
consumers. And there is some evidence that, insulated from 
competition, private monopolies may suffer from several 
forms of inefficiency and may not be highly innovative... there 
are strong incentives not only for private rent seeking [i.e., 
corrupt patronage-related activity] on the part of [privatised 
firm] management, but for taking actions which increase the 
scope for such rent seeking. 
 
Stiglitz (1998, 18-19) cited the examples of China, which "managed to sustain 
double-digit growth by extending the scope of competition, without privatising 
state-owned enterprises," and Russia, which in contrast "privatised a large 
fraction of its economy without doing much so far to promote competition. 
The consequence of this and other factors has been a major economic 
collapse." Stiglitz (1998, 19) concluded that "Privatising monopolies creates 
huge rents. It has proved difficult to administer privatisation without 
encouraging corruption and other problems. Entrepreneurs will have the 
incentive to try to secure privatised enterprises rather than invest in creating 
their own firms." 
 Notwithstanding the criticisms, the White Paper endorsed privatisation, 
while acknowledging risks of "cherry-picking" (refusal to provide services to 
low-income areas), poor quality services and unfair labour practices. A virtually 
unstoppable momentum had built up by 1999, reflecting continuity, not 
change, from late apartheid. Many large municipalities had, after all, closed 
down their public housing and in some cases civil engineering departments 
during the 1980s, and by the early 1990s the (white-run) Eastern Cape was the 
site of several small (but long-term, thoroughly monopolised) water 
privatisation pilot projects, including Queenstown (1992), Stutterheim (1994) 
and Fort Beaufort (1995). Water privatisation in Nelspruit and the Dolphin 
Coast were temporarily stalled in 1998 by trade union-led resistance, and their 
1999 resuscitations were mired in a controversy over whether DCD Minister 
Valli Moosa had bargained in bad faith with the SA Municipal Workers Union 
(Samwu). Meanwhile other major exploratory projects were underway, 
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facilitated by a R30 million US AID grant to DCD for the development of PPP 
business plans in various towns. These included Cape Town, Port Elizabeth 
and Stellenbosh (where water and sanitation were reviewed by 1999), Benoni 
(fire and emergency services) and several towns where refuse removal would be 
privatised. (In Cape Town's Khayelitsha township, the Billy Hattingh private 
rubbish removal scheme was so unsuccessful that by 1999, municipal workers 
had to be redeployed to back up the company.)  
 These early PPPs suggest a penchant for long-term management 
contracts, entailing "delegation" of defined municipal functions for a ten, 
twenty-five or thirty year period. They include the operation, rehabilitation, 
maintenance, customer services and expansion of assets, which are, however, 
still owned by the municipalities. Contracts are flexible, allowing for the 
company to extend or upgrade facilities but with municipal or non-company 
finances. Unlike concession contracts, they involve less greenfield investment 
(such as extension of services to townships) and hence far lower risks for the 
successful bidder. 
 Companies like Water and Sanitation South Africa (WSSA, a 
Lyonnaise des Eaux/Group Five joint venture) promised to "render an 
affordable, cost affective and optimised service, implement effective consumer 
management" and ensure that customers are "willing and able to pay for 
services, while maximising revenue collection" (WSSAa, 1995, 1). Benefits also 
allegedly include "a more dynamic business environment, increased productive 
investment, workplace democratisation, co-operation with small and micro 
enterprise, and more open and flexible management styles" (WSSA, 1995b, 1). 
Yet in practice, in the Stutterheim pilot, water services were instead 
characterised by WSSA's failure to serve any of the 80% of the region's 
township residents (classic cherry-picking), mass cut-offs of water by the 
municipalities of township residents who could not afford payments, and the 
cooption of the main civic leader into WSSA's employ, thus effectively 
rendering silent any community protest (Bond, 1999a, Chapter Five). 
 DCD considered some of the pilots too conservative, if anything, for 
failing to promote sufficient concessions to assure increased capital 
investments. DCD officials identified constraints in the forms of legal obstacles 
and uncertainties with respect to contractual issues, tendering procedures, 
contract monitoring requirements and dispute resolution procedures. 
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Management contracts were, by 1997, said to be "only advisable when more 
ambitious forms of private participation are considered undesirable" (DCD, 
1997). The suspicion was, simply, that "contractors with international linkages 
might engage in management contracts in order to secure a privileged position 
in subsequent initiatives" rather than for the sake of providing optimum 
services, with the effect of "sabotaging open competition." 
 Having raised these concerns, DCD's Draft Guidelines for MSPs then 
proceeded to diminish the role of municipal workers by insisting that "a 
municipality must consult, but is not obligated to negotiate and reach 
agreement regarding the labour aspects of the transfer with employees or 
unions as a condition for being authorised to proceed with the transfer" (DCD, 
1998, 48). Yet the reality was that Samwu has been so effective in generating 
public opposition to DCD's plan and to participation by the British firm 
Biwater (the lead company behind Nelspruit's water contract), that, as Samwu 
described it, "In December 1998, Cosatu and Samwu signed a framework 
agreement with the local government employer body, SA Local Government 
Association (Salga) around municipal service partnerships. The agreement was 
the product of months of negotiations. It concurs with national legislation that 
the public sector is the preferred deliverer of services and specifies that 
involvement of the private sector in service delivery should only be a very last 
resort -- if there is no public sector provider willing or able to provide the 
service" (Weekes, 1999, 1). 
 And here emerges the classical problem associated with "natural 
monopoly," namely the ability of a state institution to pass along 
implementation responsibilities while still holding control over basic services 
policy (e.g., on coverage, quality, access, cost, labour conditions, etc, all of 
which the private sector would ordinarily skimp on to the public's detriment). 
The propensity of a private firm to, for example, provide cross-subsidies and 
lifeline tariffs, is extremely low, as the World Bank (Roome, 1995, 50-51) 
explicitly warned Asmal in 1995 -- since sliding-scale tariffs favouring low-
volume users "may limit options with respect to tertiary providers... in 
particular private concessions [would be] much harder to establish" -- as part of 
a lobbying campaign to dissuade him from invoking cross-subsidies. 
 The extent to which a public monopoly is simply replaced by a private 
one gives rise to yet more concern. In late 1998, Lyonnaise des Eaux 
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announced plans to establish multi-purpose utility monopolies covering water, 
sanitation, refuse, roads, cable TV and telephones, to be payable through a 
single bill, with Casablanca already witnessing the firm's pilot linkage of several 
privatised municipal services. Aware of this possibility, DCD (1998, 56) 
acknowledged that "The Competition Bill [of mid-1998] could create 
opportunities for consumers of municipal services to challenge various aspects 
of an MSP including tariff structures, tariff setting mechanisms and grants of 
monopoly rights to a service provider in both administrative and judicial 
forums" -- but reassures firms that "the power of the Competition Tribunal to 
award costs to a respondent against whom a finding has been made may act to 
restrain consumers from initiating complaints." 
 In other countries (beginning with Paris in 1985), the privatisation of 
water was at the very least done in a manner that deliberately distinguished retail 
provision from distribution, and also established geographical divides (the Left 
Bank going to Lyonnaise des Eaux and the Right Bank to General des Eaux), 
thus allowing "for a compromise where there is still outside competition and 
larger markets beckon" (Lorrain, 1997, 117). Indeed, this raises the question of 
whether water and energy should be managed at a local or regional level (i.e., 
along politico-administrative boundaries) or indeed based on geological, 
watershed/basin, or functional divides. Moreover, if water supply is separated 
from sewerage and roads, there is bound to be confusion, dislocation and 
diminished accountability. By fragmenting responsibility for road works, refuse 
removal and sanitation, residents will have to visit different company offices to 
register complaints, increasing the bureaucratic hurdles for consumers.  
 The thorniest questions are those bound up in politics and corruption, 
and hence are least transparently considered in DCD and other official work. 
Many of the transnational services firms have dubious track records, and not 
just in the notorious kickbacks and bribes associated with privatisation in 
Eastern Europe, Indonesia and the like. Even in France, the mayor of the city 
of Grenoble was imprisoned for taking bribes from Lyonnaise des Eaux and its 
local partner (Barsock, 1997, 16). Likewise in apartheid-era South Africa, WSSA 
(then called Aqua-gold) had a previous close association with repressive 
bantustan regimes beginning as early as 1987. This does not prove corruption 
in a commercial sense, but does show that unlike many other companies which 
disinvested, the French chose not only to stay but to accelerate their dealings 
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with the most discredited elements of the apartheid regime. In several towns, 
WSSA signed agreements with unrepresentative white politicians and municipal 
administrations prior to democratic elections, and without going through a 
tender process (DCD, 1998). 
 In sum, if the "basic rationale" for privatisation is that "MSP projects 
can save or avoid municipal expenditures" (DCD, 1998, 74), it should also be 
considered that a municipality has enormous burdens once a contract is signed: 
monitoring the concessionaire or contractor; undertaking expensive litigation in 
the event of disputes; establishing reliable, independent sources of information; 
and bearing the political and financial costs of failure. Typically, the 
municipality is prevented from taking direct action on complaints. 
 
CONCLUSION:  POST-WASHINGTON CONSENSUS 
INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY 
 
The struggle against apartheid was both a struggle against the politico-juridical 
system of racism and for improved quality of life. Improved residential 
infrastructure and service delivery are amongst the most crucial objectives of 
public policy, by all accounts. Many of the aspirations and concrete demands of 
South Africa's oppressed peoples are reflected in the 1994 RDP and the 1996 
Constitution, in particular the entitlement to decent standards of services. 
 Despite this mandate to govern, there has been a clear continuity of 
policy between the late-apartheid era and democracy. Some key common 
features are an often untransformed bureaucracy, white consultants at the nerve 
centre of policy-making, influence by the World Bank or its proxies, and the 
ascendance of a new breed of conservative bureaucrats (once termed 
"econocrats"). Unlike the chaotic and uncoordinated positions across most of 
government, there is a disturbing level of consensus in infrastructure-related 
departments and agencies that a) users pay, b) standards should be relatively 
low, and c) privatisation should be regularised. 
 Restating in any detail the numerous concrete problems associated 
with late-apartheid and post-apartheid infrastructure policies would belabour 
the obvious. In sum, the unsustainability of an approach to development 
modeled less on organic South African demands arising from social struggles, 
and more on the essentially neo-liberal perspective now known as the 
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"Washington Consensus," is now recognised from even within the highest 
levels at the World Bank (Stiglitz, 1998). 
 Is an RDP-friendly alternative possible? One proposal advocated by 
social change activists from community organisations and associated NGOs, 
compatible with the Constitution and RDP, was a universal free lifeline to all 
South African consumers for the first block of water (50 litres of water per 
person each day) and electricity (approximately 1 kiloWatt hour per day) with 
steeply-rising prices for subsequent consumption blocks. There would be no 
need, in this policy framework, for means-testing or a complex administrative 
apparatus, nor would complete service cut-offs feature. Recurrent consumption 
expenses would be paid for entirely from within each sector, although an 
additional 10% expenditure would be needed, beyond what the MIIF budgeted, 
to finance the added capital costs (totalling R120 billion over 10 years, a 
reasonable investment in relation to late-1990s GDP of R600 billion and an 
annual state budget of R200 billion). 
 Where social change advocates have come up short, however, was in 
turning an extensive series of mid- and late-1990s riots over municipal services 
-- which, tragically, included the assassination of an ANC mayor known for 
willingness to cut off power and water, as well as the burning of several ANC 
councillors' houses -- into more sustained, constructive political pressure (this 
partly reflected the demobilisation of the national "civic association" movement 
during the late 1990s). In contrast to an alliance between DCD and the big 
business lobby within the National Economic Development and Labour 
Council (the stakeholder forum at which state policies were often debated), the 
progressive forces failed, especially in 1996-97, to successfully contest the 
intensification of services commodification. Notwithstanding firm opposition 
by Samwu -- which also campaigned for 50 free litres of water per day to 
consumers as a means of resisting DCD divide-and-conquer strategies -- central 
government continued to advocate the privatisation of municipal services. 
 Also at stake in all of this was, as ever, the degree to which a capitalist 
state in league with big business could construct a "social wage" policy 
framework that had, as a central objective, maintaining relatively low upward 
pressure on the private-sector wage floor; in other words, by keeping monthly 
operating costs of services low through denying workers access to flush toilets, 
hot plates and heating elements, the MIIF also reduced the pressures that 
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workers would otherwise have to impose upon their employers for wages 
sufficient for the reproduction of labour power. 
 In very practical ways, the social and labour movements were too weak 
to successfully contest the broader neo-liberal trajectory, and not even the 
strongest rhetorical and technical critiques could have made up for lack of 
political clout. What looms ahead, as more than half of South Africa's 878 
municipalities prepared to face formal bankruptcy at the turn of the 21st 
century -- due to declining central-local grants and low levels of service 
payments by residents -- is potentially a stark scenario in which sufficient 
unpopularity with ANC rule emerges, so as to generate conditions amenable to 
a more progressive backlash either within the Alliance or, around the time of 
the 2005 election, the emergence of a leftwing alternative to the ruling party. 
Until then, it will be up to activists in civil society organisations, probably led by 
Samwu in key sites of privatisation struggles and potentially joined by a nascent 
alternative civic movement in Gauteng, to remind society at large that the 
transition from late-apartheid to post-apartheid infrastructure policy remains 
unsatisfying, to put it mildly. 
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